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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The relative utility hypothesis, which supposes that individuals care about the social
aspect of wealth accumulation in addition to caring about consumption, is supported in
numerous empirical investigations (see e.g. Clark and Oswald, 1996; Kapteyn, Van de
Geer, Van de Stadt and Wansbeek, 1997, McBride, 2001). It is shown that an individual￿s
welfare depends both positively on her wealth and negatively on a reference level of the
society. This relativity assumption has been used to explain many economic phenomena.
For instance, it is used by Easterlin (1974) to explain the paradox that individual welfare
is increasing with individual income while the average welfare remains independent of
the material standard of living. Long and Shimomura (2004) claim that the desire for
wealth-enhanced social status can explain the process of catching up with the rich by the
poor.
The conjecture that wealth accumulation yields social status and that status matters
for individual welfare has been emphasized in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith,
1759). In The Theory of the Leisure Class, Veblen (1899) has focused on the role of
conspicuous consumption in signalling social status. The social aspect of consumption
is also found inThe Social Limits to Growth (Hirsch, 1976). Recently, the role of social
rewards as motive of individual behavior has been incorporated into models of economic
growth.1 By considering preferences for social status, economists emphasize the role of the
demand side, which is determined by individual preferences, as determinant of economic
growth, apart from the role of the supply side. In particular, Corneo and Jeanne (2001a)
showed that the competition to achieve social status can generate endogenous long-run
growth.
This paper introduces status preferences into an endogenous growth model with pub-
lic sector. It builds on the conventional framework of Glomm and Ravikumar (1994),
where ￿scal policy ￿nancing public capital is endogenously determined through a voting
mechanism. The economy is populated by two types of agents who care about both con-
s u m p t i o na n ds o c i a ls t a t u s . T h el a t t e ri sa ni n c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o no fb o t ha b s o l u t ea n d
relative wealth. Agents are heterogeneous in two aspects: wealth endowment and weight
attached to status-seeking. The implications of status-seeking behavior on wealth distri-
bution, endogenous ￿scal policy as well as political equilibrium growth are investigated.
We also discuss the relationship between individual welfare and growth in this economy
where agents exhibit a desire for status.
In the framework without status consideration, Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) found
the income convergence in the long run independent of the initial wealth distribution. In
our model, we ￿rst show that the status-seeking behavior, and not the wealth endowment,
is crucial in determining the long-run wealth distribution: agents with stronger status
motive will hold a higher level of wealth. For the same incentive in wealth accumulation,
1Social status of an individual can be de￿ned by her relative wealth (Corneo and Jeanne, 1997, 2001a,b;
Long and Shimomura, 2004), or relative consumption (Rauscher, 1997; Fischer and Hof, 2000). Further-
more, Fershtman, Murphy and Weiss de￿ne social status as the human capital accumulation.
2agents end up holding the same quantity of wealth. In other words, the conclusion in the
conventional model is a particular case of our model for which status motive of both types
of agents is identical and equal to zero.
Standard economic growth models generally predict a negative relation between in-
equality and growth. For instance, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) ￿nd a negative
relation, considering the eﬀects of wealth distribution on the composition of demand and
the techniques of production. The introduction of status-seeking into growth model pro-
vides a relation between wealth distribution and growth which is diﬀerent from the usual
link found in the growth literature. In our model, since income divergence is due to diﬀer-
ence in individual incentive to accumulate wealth, a higher inequality is associated with a
higher growth if it is due to higher incentive to accumulate wealth of one group of agents.
Otherwise, it is shown that a higher growth rate may reduce welfare of one group of agents
and raise that of other one. Finally, when the ￿scal policy is endogenously determined
through a voting mechanism, an increase in the strength of status motive of majoritarian
class may lead to a reduced political equilibrium growth.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section lays out the modeling framework with
status-seeking agents. Section 3 presents the steady state analysis under exogenous ￿scal
policy. Section 4 adds endogenous ￿scal policy via a voting mechanism and studies the
eﬀect of status-seeking on political equilibrium growth. Section 5 concludes.
2 A model with status-seeking agents
We develop the model of Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) including status-seeking behavior.
Let assume that the economy has two groups of agents.2 The population size is δ for the
￿rst group, and 1 − δ for the second group. Agents into each group are identical, so that
there is a representative agent for each group. Each agent is supposed to care about both
consumption (cit) and social status, which increases with her wealth (kit) and decreases
with the average level of the society (kt). The intertemporal utility function for agent i is











,i =1 ,2 (1)
where 0 < β < 1, 0 < θ < 1, and kt = δk1t +( 1− δ)k2t.
We do not attach importance to the distribution of wealth endowment between two
groups of agents, i.e. k10 may be higher, equal or lower than k20, with ki0 > 0, for i =1 ,2.
Instead, two group of agents are distinguished by their attitude towards social status. The
parameter si measures the importance of agent i￿s utility from social status (i.e. strength
of status-seeking motive) as compared to the importance of her utility from consumption.
si is in the interval [0;1).3 The value of si is exogenous and the size of each group, δ and
2In Glomm and Ravikumar￿s model, the economy is populated by a continuum of heterogeneous
household-producers.
3We exclude the case with si =1to avoid the extreme situation where social status is all-important
and consumption does not give any satisfaction.
31 − δ, a r ea s s u m e dt ob ec o n s t a n to v e rt i m e( i . e . t h e r ei sn oe x i ta n dn oe n t r yf o re a c h
group). This model is then consistent with no social mobility.
The utility from consumption is represented by ln(cit). The utility from social status





. This speci￿cation of utility formalizes the assumption that
wealth accumulation gives satisfaction to agent i through an improvement of her social












In this formulation, the status utility involves two components: absolute and relative
wealth. The parameter θ represents the weight assigned to relative wealth, and 1 − θ
the weight assigned to absolute wealth in the individual quest for status. Diﬀerent from
most existing studies, such a speci￿cation of status utility does not give generally the same
weight to an increase in individual wealth and to a decrease in the average level of wealth.4
In addition, θ may be interpreted as the degree of the individual￿s social interaction (Jellal
and Rajhi, 2003).






where A>0 and α ∈ (0,1) are constant parameters. The aggregate variable Zt, which is
the stock of public capital at t, is assumed to be a pure public good. The variables kit
and lit are private capital and labor force, respectively. Each agent is supposed to supply
one unit of labor force inelastically.
The underlying assumption is that the economy is segmented in two sectors, and there
are no transfers of production factors from a sector to another. This lack of transfer may
be explained either by barriers, or by potential heterogeneity of two types of capital and
two types of labor. For example, one may think that quali￿ed and unquali￿ed labor force
are not freely transferable from a market to another, due to markets speci￿cities. This
modeling is used in the model of Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) and can be found in
Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Cardak (1999), Gradstein (2003).5
As in the model of Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), agent i is assumed to be both
household and producer, i =1 ,2. Then, there are no markets for production factors (see
also Glomm and Ravikumar, 1995; Lau, 1995 ; Mohtadi and Roe, 1998, etc.). This mod-
eling captures the notion that the agents derive satisfaction from the consumption of a
non-marketed or home good. It should be noticed that if we keep the assumption of no
4For instance, the status function depending only on relative wealth is proposed in Corneo and Jeanne
(1997), Futagami and Shibata (1998), Long and Shimomura (2004), while the status function depending
only on absolute wealth is proposed in Zou (1994), Gong and Zou (2002) and Hosoya (2002).
5For instance, in Gradstein (2003), household i￿s production function is yit+1 = Ait+1 [f(xit+1)Gt]
α
where Gt = τt
R 1
0 yitdi is public spending on education, ￿nanced by income tax. xit+1 is her investment
made in an attempt to ensure a larger share of educational resources for her oﬀspring, and Ait+1 is her
production capability. Her budget constraint is given by: cit + xit+1 =( 1− τt)Ait [f(xit)Gt−1]
α.
4factors transfers but relax the assumption of household-producer (i.e. incorporating seg-
mented factor markets), the mains results of the paper will remain unchanged. Appendix
A presents the model with segmented factor markets.
Both public and private capital are assumed to depreciate fully in one period. There-
fore, private capital obtained by agent i at period t +1is equal to her investment at t,
iit
kit+1 = iit.
Public capital at time t +1is equal to public investment at t,It
Zt+1 = It, (3)
where It is ￿nanced by taxing individual income at rate τ, and the government￿s budget











T h ei n i t i a ls t a t eo fp u b l i cc a p i t a lZ0 is exogenous.
Agent i chooses {cit,k it+1}
∞
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cit,k it+1 ≥ 0,
lit =1 ,
given ki0,Z 0 and {τt,Z t+1}
∞
t=0
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The left hand side is the marginal cost (in utility terms) of reducing consumption at time
t (cit) by a unit. The right hand side is the discounted marginal bene￿t of increasing an
additional unit of private capital into time t +1(kit+1). Marginal bene￿ti se q u a lt on e t
marginal product of private capital times the marginal utility of consumption at t +1
added to marginal utility of private capital at t+1(which does not exists in conventional
model). For agent i￿s optimal choice, the marginal cost must equal marginal bene￿t.
Combining condition (7) and budget constraint provides us the following solutions:
cit =


















5The transversality condition is: lim
t→∞
λtkt+1 =l i m
t→∞
(1 − si)βtkt+1/cit =0 , where λ is the
shadow price of wealth. The ￿rst order conditions are also suﬃcient for a maximum since
the Lagrangian is concave.
Given the initial ki0,Z 0 a n da na r b i t r a r y￿scal policy implemented in each period, an
intertemporal equilibrium is the sequence of consumption, private capital and labor force
such that
￿ lit =1and {cit,k it+1}
∞
t=0 is given by Eqs. (8), (9), for i =1 ,2
￿ cit + kit+1 =( 1− τ)AZα
t k1−α




1t +( 1− δ)k1−α
2t
⁄
￿ kt = δk1t +( 1− δ)k2t for any t ≥ 0.
3 Steady state analysis










for i,j =1 ,2 and t ≥ 0.
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In the following, we restrict our attention to steady-state analysis in which all variables
(consumption, private capital, public capital) grow at the same rate g. The steady state














for i,j =1 ,2. (15)
W1 =
τ



















3.1 Wealth distribution and status-seeking
Let q1 be the fraction of agent 1￿s wealth relative to total wealth, k1t+1 = q1kt+1. We can
write k2t+1 = q2kt+1, for any t ≥ 0, with q2 =( 1− δq1)/(1 − δ).
6Proposition 1 (Steady state wealth distribution)
i). Agent i will hold more wealth than agent j if her status-seeking motive is stronger
than agent j’s status-seeking motive
qi ≷ qj if si ≷ sj. (17)
i i ) .A ni n c r e a s ei na g e n ti’s status-seeking motive yields larger the fraction of her wealth






< 0 for i,j =1 ,2. (18)
Proof. See Appendix B.
The conclusion in Glomm and Ravikumar￿s model concerning income convergence is
overturned when status behavior is taken into account. Actually, Glomm and Ravikumar
(1994) show that wealth inequality declines over time, and then all agents have the same
wealth in the long run whatever the initial distribution. In addition, a similar result to that
of Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) can be found in Glomm and Ravikumar (1992)￿s model
with education expenditures. They show that in public education regime, the growth rate
of any agent￿s income is inversely related to the level of her income. Thus agents with
i n c o m eb e l o wt h ea v e r a g eg r o wf a s t e rt h a na g e n t sw i t hi n c o m ea b o v et h ea v e r a g e ,a n d
then incomes end up by converging over time.
Proposition 1 shows that the status behavior is crucial in explaining the long-run
wealth divergence. Our ￿nding underlines the cause of wealth divergence through the
s t a t u sb e h a v i o r :a g e n t se n du pb yh o l d i n gt h es a m eq u a n t i t yo fw e a l t hi ft h e yh a v et h e
same incentive to accumulate wealth (i.e. s1 = s2); and Glomm and Ravikumar￿s result
corresponds to the case where s1 = s2 =0in our model. Such a result is explained by the
following intuition. On the one hand, the marginal status utility of wealth being equal to
the term 1/kit, is decreasing with kit. This means that poor people get more satisfaction
from a marginal increase in wealth than rich people. On the other hand, a higher value
of si corresponds to a higher importance of the utility from social status as compared
to the utility from consumption. This implies a stronger incentive to accumulate wealth.
Therefore, given wealth endowment with k1,0 <k 2,0 for example, if s1 = s2, agent 1 will
c a t c hu pw i t ha g e n t2 as she gets more satisfaction from a marginal increase in wealth. If
s1 >s 2, she catch-ups with agent 2 before to hold a larger share of total wealth since she
assigns more importance to accumulate wealth than agent 2.6
The ￿nding indicated in Proposition 1 is in line with the sociological theory explain-
ing the poverty by individual negative attitudes (for instance lack of eﬀort). However, it
6This conclusion is close to the well known work by Ramsey (1928) using a model without status
seeking. Ramsey shows that if the subjective discount rate diﬀers across agents, the most patient will hold
all the wealth. Indeed, if agent i has a discount rate lower than agent j, it means that agent i cares about
his future life more seriously, and thus her saving incentive becomes higher. She ends up holding the total
of wealth. Cardak (1999) ￿nd that households with the strongest preference for education will have the
greatest income, independent of initial conditions.
7contrasts with the theory explaining the poverty by social pattern (such as lack of equal
opportunity, that we can interpret as unequal wealth endowment in our model).7 Our
￿nding suggests that redistributive policy taxing agents with higher status motive and
subsidizing agents with lower status motive is not a good solution for economic growth as
the poverty does not stem from the lack of equal opportunity. Such policy may discourage
wealth accumulation of agents with high eﬀort.8 A government intervention regarding in-
dividual preferences may be preferable, however this type of intervention is rather complex
because it should act to ￿modify￿ individual motivation, or preferences.
We should note that growth models with status-seeking generate diverse conclusions
concerning wealth distribution, and it is partially due to the diﬀerence in hypothesis. For
instance, Futagami and Shibata (1998) examine a growth model where the subjective
discount rate diﬀers across agents and relative wealth determines social status. These
authors conclude that even less patient agents could hold a positive share of the total
wealth, because utility from their relative wealth position decreases until they catch up
with more patient agents. In an exogenous growth model, Long and Shimomura (2004)
claim that if the elasticity of marginal utility of relative wealth is greater than the elasticity
of marginal utility of consumption, thus eventually poor people will be able to catch
up with rich people. This catching-up is found in our model only when s1 = s2.9 On
the contrary, Corneo and Jeanne (1999) found the persistence inequality in a two-classes
growth model in which agents care about the social perception of their wealth rank as
determinant of their social status. Their result is explained as follows. On the one hand,
the total marginal return on savings, in terms of consumption and esteem, is identical
for a poor and a rich agent. On the other hand, the marginal status utility of wealth
is assumed to be identical for two types of agents (while it is concave in our model).
Their speci￿cation implies that poor and rich people have the same wealth accumulation
incentive, and wealth inequality remains constant overtime.
3.2 Long-run growth and status-seeking
The constant value of Wi ≡ Z/ci and Xi ≡ ki/ci at the steady state implies that all
variables grow at the same rate g which is approximately equal to ln(Zt+1/Zt)












7See for example Kluegel, Csepeli, Kolosi, ￿rkeny and NemØnyi (1995) and Kreidl (1998) for other
explanatory factors about income divergence.
8For instance, Fields (1989) showed in an empirical study that redistributive policy is not necessarily
wealth-improving. The author found that in an economy with diﬀerent propensities to save, the transfers
from rich to poor people, which reduces the inequality, reduce capital accumulation and economic growth.
9It is should be noticed that the model in Long and Shimomura (2004) represents the integrated
economy with only one representative ￿rm, and an aggregate production function. It is implicitly assumed
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, for i,j =1 ,2.
Notice that the impact of ￿scal policy on growth rate is exerted through two terms
αlnτ and (1 − α)ln(1− τ). The ￿rst one represents the positive eﬀect of public capital
on the private capital marginal product and the second one represents the negative eﬀect
of taxation on net bene￿ce rate of saving. The endogenization of individual preferences
allows us to take into account individuals￿ action. It is exerted through the last term.
Figure 1 illustrates the growth rate at asymmetric and symmetric steady state. Each
agent has an individual speci￿c growth rate, determined by Eqs. (20) and (21):
g1 =l n Aβ1−α +l n( 1− τ)
1−α τα +( 1− α)lnh1 + αln
h




g2 =l n Aβ1−α +l n( 1− τ)






The decreasing curve represents the wealth growth rate of agent 1, which is decreasing with
q1. The increasing curve represents the wealth growth rate of agent 2, which is decreasing
with q2. The intersection point between both curves gives the value of growth rate in the
long run, written in Eq. (19). The graph on the left hand side of ￿gure 1 represents
the growth rate at an asymmetric steady state (non-egalitarian wealth distribution) with
q1 >q 2 corresponding to s1 >s 2. The graph on the right hand side represents a symmetric
case (egalitarian wealth distribution) when s1 = s2.
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Figure 1. The growth rate at the asymmetric and symmetric steady state.
F i g u r e s2a n d3g i v ear e p r e s e n t a t i o no ft h ew e a l t h - p u b l i cc a p i t a lr a t i ok/Z and a
r e p r e s e n t a t i o no ft h eg r o w t hr a t ei nf u n c t i o no fs1 and s2.
Figure 2: Wealth-public capital ratio as a function of s1 and s2
(α =0 .7,β =0 .8,δ =0 .4,τ =0 .3)
10Figure 3: Growth rate as a function of s1 and s2
(α =0 .7,β =0 .8,δ =0 .4,τ =0 .3,A=3 .)
It happens that status-seeking has a positive impact on total wealth and growth rate.
Intuitively, the higher is the parameter si, for i =1 ,2, the stronger is the importance that
agent i assigns to social status as compared to consumption in her quest for satisfaction.
Therefore, she is more incited to accumulate wealth. This implies an increase in the
quantity of total wealth, which has a positive impact on growth.
It should be noticed that an increase in wealth inequality might be associated with
either a higher or a lower growth rate. For instance, from a symmetric situation where
s1 = s2 corresponding to q1 = q2,t h e￿rst possibility will be held when there is an increase
in agent i￿s status motive while agent j￿s status motive remains unchanged. Actually, this
increase of si leads to a higher growth rate corresponding to a non-egalitarian wealth
distribution in favor of agent i. This new situation is preferred in terms of growth than
the symmetric situation. The possibility that wealth inequality is associated with a lower
growth rate will be held when there is a decrease in agent i￿s status motive. Actually,
ad e c r e a s eo fsi corresponds to a decrease in her incentive to accumulate wealth. This
reduces the total wealth of the society, which has a negative eﬀect on growth.
In other words, higher inequality due to stronger incentive to accumulate wealth of one
group of agents may be consistent with a higher growth. With this result, status-seeking
behavior can be considered as an explaining argument, among others, for recent empirical
studies on emerging Asian economies, which indicate that strong growth is associated with
11a fall in poverty and a rise in inequality (see e.g. Justino and Litch￿eld, 2003 for an study
on Vietnamese case; Benjamin et al., 2004 for an analysis on Chinese case).
3.3 Welfare and long-run growth
We investigate now the growth eﬀect on lifetime utility of each agent. Notice that
lnvit =l n vi0 + gt, where v = c,ki,k, for t>0 (22)
ci0 =( 1 − τ)yi0 − ki1 =( 1− τ)yi0 − ki0 expg (23)
where yi0 = AZα
0 k1−α
i0 , for i =1 ,2. (24)
Substituting Eqs. (22), and (23) into Eq. (1), agent i￿s lifetime utility is given by
Ui =( 1 − si)ln[(1− τ)yi0 − ki0 expg]
∞ X
t=0
βt +( 1− siθ)g
∞ X
t=0
























We realize that the relationship between individual welfare and growth has an inverted-U:
∂Ui
∂g
≥ 0 ⇔ g ≤ ˆ gi (26)
where ˆ gi =l n
‰
(1 − siθ)(1− τ)βAZα
0
(1 − siθ)β +( 1− β)(1− si)kα
i0
￿
This implies that economic growth is not necessarily welfare-improving. In addition, the
positive or negative correlation between welfare and growth depends in part on the strength
of status-seeking motive. Actually, as welfare-maximizing growth rate ˆ gi is increasing with
si, the probability that g is on the increasing part of the curve Ui (g) is higher when si is
higher.
Moreover, as ˆ gi is diﬀerent between agent 1 and agent 2, this means that when the
growth rate is higher, it is possible that a part of the population is happier while another
o n ei sl e s sh a p p y . 10 In other words, our ￿nding shows that in an economy with non-
egalitarian either initial distribution (k1,0 6= k2,0) or long-run distribution (k1 6= k2 due to
s1 6= s2), it is possible that economic growth is welfare-improving for only one group of
the population.
4E n d o g e n o u s ﬁscal policy
In this section we investigate the implications of status-seeking behavior on the vote of tax
rate and political equilibrium growth. We endogenize the ￿scal policy by assuming that
the tax rate τt is chosen through a majority voting. As the income tax is ￿nancing the
10A numerical example: α =0 .6, β =0 .8, τ =0 .3, θ =0 .8,A=3 ,Z 0 =1 ,k 1,0 =2 .5,k 2,0 =2 ,s 1 =0 .5
and s2 =0 .4. These values of parameters give ˆ g1 =0 .4% and ˆ g2 =1 2 % . Therefore, if the growth rate of
the economy is in the interval (0.004,0.12), a higher growth rate will imply a lower welfare for agent 1,
and a higher welfare for agent 2.
12public factor of production, agents face a trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, a higher tax rate at
period t lowers current consumption and private investment which becomes future private
capital, and then reduces current utility and future output. On the other hand, a higher
tax rate at period t implies more public investment, which becomes future public capital,
and then leads to higher future output. The chosen tax rate will balance the losses against
the gains.
The optimal tax rate for agent i, for i =1 ,2, at period t for any t ≥ 0, is determined
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τt ∈ [0,1],
kt = δk1t +( 1− δ)k2t,
cit =




























αβ (1 − si)lnτt +[ ( 1− si)(1+β − αβ)+siβ (1 − θ)]ln(1 − τt)+Di.
where Di corresponds to other variables and parameters which are independent of τt. The
optimal tax rate for agent i is given by
τit ≡ τ (si,θ)=
αβ (1 − si)
1 − si + β (1 − siθ)
, (i =1 ,2) (27)
Notice that in the case without status consideration, the chosen tax rate is identical
for all agents, while it is diﬀerent between two types of agents when status matters for
individual welfare. We have ∂τ (si,θ)/∂si < 0. The intuition of this negative eﬀect is
as follows. A higher value of si corresponds to a higher importance of the utility from
status as compared to the utility from consumption. This implies a stronger incentive to
accumulate wealth. Therefore it is to the detriment of consumption and of chosen tax.
However, we have ∂τ (s,θ)/∂θ > 0. This implies that the case where status utility
is determined only by absolute wealth (i.e. θ =0 ) is the worst situation for public
expenditure determined by majority voting. Intuitively, when θ =0 , status preferences
lead each individual to accumulate wealth as high as possible without comparison with
others. Therefore, she will vote on the lowest tax rate by keeping the maximum of wealth
for herself. On the contrary, when θ > 0, status utility depends on both absolute and
relative wealth, i.e. individual compares her wealth level to the average level of the society.
She can anticipate that the choice of a higher lowers her wealth as well as the wealth of
13other people. She feels then less loss of relative standing when choosing a high tax rate.
This may explain the positive eﬀect of θ on τ (si,θ).
As the economy involves two groups of agents, it is reasonable that the median agent
is in majoritarian group. Let us assume the group 2￿s size 1 − δ is higher than 1/2. This
implies that the voted tax rate of group 2 will overcome that chosen by the group 1.
Therefore the equilibrium tax rate is equal to τ (s2,θ). Notice that the tax rate which
maximizes the growth is equal to α. Then both τ (s1,θ) and τ (s2,θ) are lower than the
growth-maximizing tax rate. Therefore, whether the median agent belongs to group 1 or
group 2, her welfare-maximizing tax rate is in the increasing part of the curve g(τ). This
is consistent with empirical ￿nding on positive correlation between public investment and
growth (see, e.g. Barro, 1991, and Perotti, 1996).11
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Figure 4 gives a representation of the political equilibrium growth rate as a function of s1
and s2.
Figure 4. Political equilibrium growth as a function of status-seeking motive (α =0 .6,
δ =0 .4,β =0 .8,A=3 ).
11See also Lau (1995) for this line of discussion. This author considers that the stock of public infras-
tructure, instead of the ￿ow used in Barro (1990), appears as an input in the production process. His
results imply that empirically, if the government maximizes the welfare of the citizens, the share of public
investment will be on the increasing part of the concave function of the growth rate (and the share of
public consumption will be on the decreasing part of the growth rate function).
14The growth impact of status-seeking of group 1 remains positive as it is found under
exogenous ￿scal policy regime. Group 1￿s status preferences are directed toward a pro-
ducible asset (i.e. capital wealth). Her wealth accumulation in order to satisfy her desire
for social status will keep expanding production and therefore economy will grow. On the
contrary, group 2￿s status-seeking has two opposite eﬀects on growth. On the one hand, a
stronger status-seeking motive has a negative eﬀect on the chosen tax rate. This reduces
public capital and leads to lower output. On the other hand, a stronger status motive
has a positive eﬀect on private capital accumulation.12 This leads to a higher output.
Figure 4 shows that when status-seeking motive is suﬃciently strong, the negative eﬀect
will dominate. This result suggests that a strong status motive might have a negative
eﬀe c to ng r o w t hi nad e m o c r a t i ce c o n o m y .
5C o n c l u s i o n
Status-seeking has received an increasing attention from the economic growth literature.
Our contribution to this line of research is to investigate wealth distribution, endogenous
￿scal policy, as well as political equilibrium growth rate in a two-classes growth model.
We have extended the conventional model of Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) by assuming
that individuals care about both consumption and social status.
Our ￿rst result underlines the crucial role of status-seeking behavior in explaining the
long-run wealth distribution. Second, it is shown that a higher inequality will be associ-
ated with a higher growth if it is due to a stronger incentive to accumulate wealth of one
class of agents. These ￿ndings suggest that redistributive policy, which aims to restore
an egalitarian distribution by taxing agents with higher status motive and subsidizing
agent with lower status motive, is not necessarily bene￿cial in terms of growth. A govern-
ment intervention regarding individual preferences may be preferable. However this type
of intervention is rather complex because it should act, through an adequate system of
incentives, to ￿modify￿ individual motivation.
In this paper, it is argued that a higher growth rate may reduce welfare of one class of
agents and raise welfare of other one. Finally, when ￿scal policy is determined through a
voting mechanism, higher status motive of majoritarian class may reduce political equilib-
rium growth. This result suggests that interpersonal dependency of preferences enhanced
by competition to achieve social status may explain the disparity in government size across
economies, and the disparity in long-run growth across economies.
Our results are obtained from logarithmic preferences and Cobb-Douglas technology.
For a more general setting, we can compute the private decisions on the basis of numerical
exercises. We may extend our study by examining the social justice through social mobility
or redistributive policy, and its eﬀects on individual welfare and long-run growth. It would
12Notice that with endogenous ￿scal policy, there are two eﬀects of a higher value of s on private capital
accumulation in one period. The direct eﬀect stems from the higher importance of capital accumulation
as compared to consumption in the individual quest for happiness. The indirect eﬀect stems from a higher
after-tax wealth due to a lower voted tax rate.
15be also interesting to expand beyond the voting mechanism to incorporate lobbyism into
the political process of our model. In this case, tax rates will be determined in a political
equilibrium which is based on lobbying activities instead of majority voting.
6 Appendix A: Model with segmented factor markets
This appendix presents the model used in section 2 but now with factor markets. It is
assumed that in each sector, a representative producer uses capital and labor provided by
the household in her sector. The consumption good price is normalized to unit. Apart
from the inclusion of segmented factor markets and output market, the rest of the analysis
framework remains unchanged, i.e. the economy is segmented and there are no transfers
of production factors, as in the model of Glomm and Ravikumar (1994).
The household i￿s budget constraint appeared in problem (P1) becomes
cit + kit+1 =( 1− τ)(wit + ritkit) (A1)
where wit and rit are her wage rate and interest rate, respectively. The condition (7)













As public investment is ￿nanced by income tax, its function given in (4) is rewritten
as
It = τ [δ(w1t + r1tk1t)+( 1− δ)(w2t + r2tk2t)] (A3)






it − witlit − ritkit
s.t.
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kit,l it ≥ 0,












It should be noticed that in the model of Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), the economy
is populated by a continuum of heterogeneous household-producers. Therefore, there are
no production factor markets (see also e.g. Chatterjee, Cooper and Ravikumar, 1993;
Glomm and Ravikumar, 1995; Lau, 1995; Mohtadi and Roe, 1998). Non-equalization of
marginal products of factors across ￿rms is possible in the segmented economy where there
are no factor transfers. When we include the segmented factor markets in each sector of
this model, the competitive economy implies that wage rate, wit (interest rate, rit)o f
16household i in sector i will be equal to the marginal product of labor (marginal product
of capital) in this sector. Therefore, non-equalization of factor marginal products across
￿rms will imply non-equalization of factor incomes.
Substituting (A4) and (A5) in equations (A1) and (A3) gives the budget constraint
appeared in the optimization problem (P1) and the public investment function (4). In
addition, combining (A2), (A4), (A5) and the budget constraint gives the household i￿s
optimal choice at the intertemporal competitive equilibrium. This optimal choice is given
by equations (8) and (9).
Therefore, the inclusion of segmented factor markets in this economy segmented with-
out factor transfers does not modify the main results of the paper. Instead, only inter-
mediate calculations are slightly modi￿ed. Household optimal choice at the intertemporal
competitive equilibrium is exactly her choice at the intertemporal equilibrium without seg-
mented factor markets considerations. The steady state of the economy is unchanged. In
other words, the Glomm and Ravikumar (1994)￿s results and the ￿ndings of this paper
are independent on the assumption of no factor markets. Instead, they are dependent on
the assumption of no factor transfers. We expect that releasing the no transfer hypothesis
will completely modify the analysis, and this is beyond the scope of this paper.13












δq1 +( 1− δ)q2 =1
The ￿rst equation of the above system comes from Eq. (15) by considering R12 = q1/q2.

















α(1 + βs − s)+( 1− β)(1+αs − α)
(1 + βs − s)
2 > 0.
Therefore if s1 >s 2, this implies h(s1) >h(s2). We will then obtain h(s1)
1/αh(s2)
−1/α >
1. This means that if the status-seeking motive of agent 1 is stronger than that of agent
2,t h e na g e n t1 holds a higher share of total wealth at the steady-state.
13See, for example, Chatterjee, Cooper and Ravikumar (1993) for an segmented economy with two sectors
where economic agents are both households and producers. Agents derive utility from the consumption
of the output produced in other sector. There is then the transfer of output between from a sector to
another.





























as ∂h1/∂s1 > 0. By analogy, we obtain ∂q2/∂s2 > 0 and ∂q1/∂s2 < 0.
8 Appendix C: Fiscal policy under majority voting

















               
               
τt ∈ [0,1],
kt = δk1t +( 1− δ)k2t
cit =
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                  
kt = δk1t +( 1− δ)k2t
cit =






















































18Substituting constraints into the value function gives us the equivalent program
max
0≤τt≤1
αβ (1 − si)lnτt +[ ( 1− si)(1+β − αβ)+siβ (1 − θ)]ln(1 − τt)+Di.
where Di contains other variables and parameters independent of τt,
D =[ ( 1 − si)(1+β − αβ)+siβ]lnyit − siθβln[δy1t(1 − E1)+( 1− δ)y2t (1 − E2)] +
+αβ (1 − si)lnyt + si lnkit − siθlnkt + β (1 − si)ln(1− τt+1)+
+(1+β)(1− si)lnEi +[ β (1 − si)(1− α)+βsi]ln(1− Ei) −










+ β (1 − si)lnβ (1 − α)A
where yit = AZα
t k1−α
it and yt = δy1t +( 1− δ)y2t, and kt = δk1t +( 1− δ)k2t.
The ￿rst derivative of the value function is given by
αβ (1 − si)
τt
−
(1 − si)(1+β − αβ)+siβ (1 − θi)
1 − τt
.
Then, the preferred tax rate is
τt ≡ τ (si,θ)=
αβ (1 − si)
1 − si + β (1 − siθ)




αβ (1 − θ)





αβ2si (1 − s)





αβ2 [1 + β + βsiθ − si (1 + 2β)]
[1 − si + β (1 − siθ)]
3 < 0 if θi <
si (1 + 2β) − (1 + β)
βsi
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